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ABSTRACT
Although normative oodels of financial decision making prescribe that sunk
costs should be ignored when allocating resources to a course of action,
behavioral decision research suggests that sunk costs have an affect on the
behaviors of decision makers who experience them. Three behavioral science
models, entrapment, escalation and prospect theory, are reviewed, the
conditions under which such biases are likely to occur are identified and
several strategies for managing the decision context are offered. The
implications of these research findings for future research on the effects of
sunk costs are discussed.

"Bankers, being hu-Tian, are reluctant to admit mistakes...
One way to hide a little mistake is to bury it under a
bigger one. So bankers cure a problem loan by lending
more money to the source of the problem..."
Bill Dutcher, "Confessions of a Penn
Square Borrower", The Wall Street Journal
,
August 15, 1985, p. 24,
Much of the scholarly literature in finance is devoted to the development
and analysis of normative models. Academics, and financial managers, are
rightfully interested in how to make the best decisions and judgments on
financial matters. The above quote, however, illustrates a somewhat different
concern of a behavioral nature. Unquestionably, the banker described by Mr.
Dutcher is aware of the normative guidelines that inform lending decisions and
has read the section on sunk costs in his accounting textbook. Why then,
would he attempt to "cure a problem loan" by lending more and, eventually,
bringing his bank to a state of collapse? Over the last decade, behavioral
scientists have been researching questions of this nature. This paper reviews
this research, discusses the implications and limitations of this research for
financial managers, suggests some ways that contextual biases, such as those
our banker faces, may be managed and describes several ways that financial
researchers may examine these issues.
In this paper, we are interesced in how financial decision makers respond
to sunk costs, which are funds committed by the decision maker that cannot be
recovered. Three models in behavioral science investigate such responses:
The entrapment model, the escalation model and the prospect theory model. We
proceed to a review of each.
The Entrapment Model
Entrapment is a process by which resource allocator.'.> become "trapped" in
a course of action, generally as a result of their decision to enter the
s5ai3con 6/11/86
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course of action in the first place. Entrapment has been studied in
laboratory settings using investment decisions that are made over time. In
these experiments, subjects are given an initial stake (of two to five
dollars) and the opportunity to win an additional sum of money (a jackpot).
In one experimental procedure, the "counter" design (Brockner, Shaw and Rubin,
1979; Brockner, Rubin and Lang, 1981; Rubin, Brockner, Small-Weil and
Nathanson, I98O), subjects are seated in front of an electronic counter that
displays numbers on a screen. Subjects are told that the counter will be set
at "1" and increase by one unit each second. The jackpot will be won if the
number on the electronic counter matches a number that was randomly generated
prior to the experimer.t, but it is possible that no match will occur and,
therefore, the jackpou will not be won. For each unit increment of the
counter, subjects must invest one cent of their initial stake. At any time
the subjects are free to stop the counter and leave with the remainder of
their stake. As such, the entrapment design Is a kind of repeated lottery
where with each cick of the counter, the subject wagers one cent against the
odds of winning the jackpot. The dependent measures of interest are the
amount of time and money subjects invest.
Rubin and Brockner (1975) suggest that investment decisions become
entrapping because resources (i.e., time, money) are viewed by investors as
both investments and as expenses. As time passes, the coat associated with
continuing the investment increases, but so does the presumed proximity to the
goal (i.e., a return on the investment). Consequently, decision makers'
motives for investing may shift from an initial desire to obtain maximum
benefits from minimum costs to concerns for (1) achievin^i the goal, (2)
justifying the costs-to-date or (3) saving face with others who observe the
decision (Brockner and Rubin, 1985; Teger, 198O). The passage of time, by
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increasing perceived goal proximity and the belief one has too much invested
to quit (Teger, 1980), contributes to what has been called entrapment (Rubin
and Brockner, 1975).
The research findings suggest that three factors contribute to
entrapment. First, the investment process affects the amount of resources
individuals invest. Investment decisions can be classified as active or
passive. Active decisions are those that require continued authorization of
expenditures. For passive decisions, the continued outlay of resources is
automatic unless the decision maker decides to terminate expenditures.
Research has shown that subjects stay in the lottery for considerably less
time when the investment process is active (Brockner et al
.
, 1979; Rubin et
al . , 1930). In addition, when decision makers establish limits on
expenditures prior to the investment process, less money is invested than in
conditions where no prior limits have been set (Brockner et al., 1979).
Second, the degree to which costs are salient to investors has also been
shown to affect resource allocations (Brockner et al., 1931; Rubin and
Brockner, 1975; Brockner, Rubin, Fine, Hamilton, Thomas and Turetsky, 1982).
When investment costs are made salient by introducing cost-to benefit ratio
charts (Brockner et al
.
, 1981; Rubin and Brockner, 1975), pointing out the
risks associated with investing (Brockner et al., 198;) and increasing the
rate of decrement on returns (Rubin and Brockner, 1975) allocations to the
course of action are reduced. Interestingly, the timing of cost salient
information also affects investments (Rubin et al., 19^2). Cost charts,
introduced midway through the investment process, do not reduce entrapment as
effectively as cost charts introduced early in the investment process.
Finally, for some investment decisions, returns on investments depend on
attaining other resources such as information, materials shipments, or
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manpower. Rubin and Brockner (1975) report when subjects perceive these
resources to be readily available, more time and money is invested compared
with conditions where these resources are not as likely to be obtained. Thus,
in addition to beliefs that the investment is likely to result in a return,
the availability of other necessary resources may affect entrapment.
In suamary, the results of this research indicate that less resources are
invested when the costs of investing are salient, either through cost/benefit
information or a decision process requiring active reevaluation. Furthermore,
this research suggests that when decision makers are made aware of the costs
associated with investing prior to the investment decision, they are more
cautious about investing in a course of action. Consequently, individuals may
reduce their allocations or, in some cases, completely avoid investing in the
course of action (Nathanson, Brockner, Brenner and Samuelson, 1932).
.Although the entrapment literature has examined a number of factors that
underlie actual investu-.ent decisions, a careful examination of these studies
raises so.Tie questions. First, most of the studies on entrapment have not
provided subjects with information regarding the probability that investments
would result in a return (i.e., winning the Jackpot). In some studies (e.g.,
Rubin and Brockner, 1975), payoff probabilities have been explicitly stated,
but most studies have either omitted this information or informed subjects
that they had "a good chance of winning" the Jackpot. If, in the absence of
explicit payoff probabilities, the experimental manipulations affected
subjective probability estimates of attaining returns, these estimates mny
account for significant differences in the amount of time or money invested.
Second, the absence of payoff probability information makes it difficult
to determine what the normative allocation rule '.-.'ould be for these types of
decisions. Although this research implies that "entrapment" is economically
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irrational, this conclusion is questionable unless it can be demonstrated that
individuals deviated from a normative rule. Consider the situation created by
Rubin and Brockner (1975) where the payoff probability was explicitly stated
to be .8. If the jackpot was $20.00, the stake was $4.00 and there were UOO
ticks on the counter, for any particular tick it would be possible for the
subject to calculate the expected value of the wager. For example, on the
first tick, the chance of winning the jackpot would be .002 (i.e., 0.8 *
1/400) and the expected value of the return would be $.04, against a wager of
$.01. On each subsequent tick, the subject behaving normatively should revise
the probability of a win by ( 1 ) subtracting 1 from the total "pool" of ticks,
which has the effect of increasing the odds, and (2) reconsidering the
estimate that there is a .8 chance of winning given the evidence (i.e. number
of losing ticks) accu-T.ulated to that point. At some point in the lottery, the
expected value of the win may no longer exceed the additional investment
(i.e., $.01). At this point, the normative subject should stop the counter.
In those studies that have not given subjects information about the
probability of a win, the appropriate stopping point cannot be determined
without the assumption of some prior probability that one of the ticks is a
winner. Interestingly, subjects following a Bayesian rule for revision, given
the evidence, would always experience an increasing expected value and should
never leave the course of action. It may also be the case, that in the
absence of explicit information, subjects attempt to maximize their
earnings. For example, subjects could have used some form of subjective
expected utility (SEU) as the basis for their allocations. At a more
primitive level, subjects could have used a rouyh cost/benefit analysis by
deciding to invest a portion of their original stake not to exceed the amount
of the Jackpot. Although an examination of the mean allocatLon.s across
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conditions indicates that investments on average rarely exceeded the Jackpot,
the corresponding cell variances indicate that some subjects did not adhere to
this rule. Thus, individuals may have revised their estimates of the
probability of winning the jackpot during the course of the experiment.
Unfortunately, individuals' subjective probability estimates have not been
measured during entrapment experiments. Consequently, it is not possible to
examine how individuals' perceptions of risk may have affected their
investment strategies.
Finally, subjects in these studies were provided an initial investment
stake. One could speculate that subjects perceived this endovmient as a
"windfall". Thus, it may not be valid to assume that individuals will make
similar investr.ent decisions if they are either investing their own resources
or acting as an agent for another investor.
The Escalation Model
From a fina.-.cial perspective, investment decisions are future focused.
That is, some forrr. of cost/benefit analysis serves as the criterion for
allocating resources. Staw and his colleagues (Staw, 1976; Staw and Fox,
1977; Staw and Ross, 1978; Fox and Staw, 1979) suggest, however, that
individuals may become psychologically committed to pursuing an investment
strategy (Fox and Staw, 1979; Staw, 1976; Staw and Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross,
1978). When a financial setback occurs, decision makers mny shift their
attention to past events and attempt to recoup losses by allocating additional
resources'. This phenomenon has been called "escalation" (Staw, 1976).
The theoretical basis for escalation is cognitive dissonance theory
(Festinger, 1957). This theory states that individuals, faced with negative
consequences arising from their actions, experience dissonance. Unable to
change their past actions, individuals reduce dissonance by cognltlvely
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restructuring the outcomes to be more positive. With respect to financial
decisions, this perspective suggests that decision makers, committed by their
previous actions, conclude setbacks are not as bad as they appear and continue
to invest resources.
Escalation has been examined in laboratory settings using simulated
pbusiness cases. In one case scenario, The Adams and Smith Financial Decision
Case (Fox and Staw, 1979; Staw, 1975; Scaw and Fox, 1977), subjects are
provided earnings/loss statements for two divisions of a firm and either a)
select a division to fund (high responsibility) or b) are told which division
their predecessor selected (low responsibility). Successful outcomes are
manipulated by earnings/loss statements for the following five year period
that indicate the chosen division returned to profitable levels while the
unchosen division continued to decline. Negative outcomes are manipulated by
statements showing the reverse trend. After subjects are provided data for
the division of interest, they decide how much should be allocated to the
division for a second time period. The dependent measure of interest is the
dollar amount of this allocation.
Responsibility for the initial decision and negative outcomes have each
been shown to increase resource allocations (Staw, 1976). Responsibility and
decision outcomes also interact, indicating chcj highest allocations are made
when individuals are faced with negative consequences resulting from their
decisions (Staw, 1976). The typical pattern of allocations is displayed in
Figure 1. These allocation patterns, however, are not consistent over
multiple time periods. Following the occurrence of a second setback, decision
makers take a more cautious approach and allocate less funda to their
initially chosen division (Staw and Fox, 1977).
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Following a setback, individuals may also attempt to justify their
decisions to others. Fox and Staw (1979) found that as Job insecurity and
hierarchical resistance to an investment decision increased, so did commitment
to a previously chosen course of action. These results suggest that
allocations may be based on attempts to demonstrate the correctness of a
previous decision or on beliefs that decision consistency V'jill be rewarded
(Staw and Ross, 1930)
.
The cause of a setback has also been reported to affect allocations.
When an investment decision fails due to the actions of a third party,
allocations are decreased (Staw and Ross, 1978) and subjects indicate a
greater priority to abandon the project by sale to another investor •
(Leatherwood and Conlcn, 1985). When negative consequences are attributable
only to the decision maker's actions (Leatherwood and Conlon, 1986) or to
unpredictable events of nature (Staw and Ross, 1978), these results are
reversed.
Although responsibility for a decision, job insecurity, hierarchical
resistance to an investment plan and setbacks attributable to the decision
maker have all been shown to increase resource allocations, most of these case
scenarios have not included sufficient information to allow t'or futuro-
revenue-to-future-cost calculations. Northcraft and Wolf (1934) point out
that because of the omission of prospectively relevant information "the
economic rationality of further resource couiraitment is left indeterminable for
the decision maker" (198^1: 227).
s5m3con 6/11/85
The omission of prospectively relevant information muddies the
interpretation of this research. If, in the absence of prospectively relevant
information, responsibility for a decision affects subjects' inferences about
future events, these inferences may account for significant differences in
allocation decisions. Conlon and Wolf (1980) found that responsibility for a
decision reduced individuals' tendencies to use a calculating strategy when
making allocation decisions. Thus, responsibility not only may alter
subjects' interpretations of negative outcomes but also may affect their
perceptions of risk, expected returns or likelihood estimates of future
costs.
The external validity of the previous studies may also be limited. Given
the ambiguous nature of the information provided in the case scenarios,
individuals may have been forced into a retrospective focus. Therefore, it
may not be .valid to assume that, based on the research findings, individuals
would act the sa.T.e way if prospectively relevant information was provided.
Finally, this research has not examined decision making situations in
which the allocation of further resources is explicitly, economically
inadvisable. Although one study by Leatherwood and Conlon (1936) provided
future-costs-to-future-revenues information to subjects (i.e., net present
value), this information indicated that further allocations were economically
advisable. Thus, in order to test whether or not psychological motivations
outweigh economic concerns, research should be conducted that examines whether
or not individuals a) pass up alternatives promising a better ratio of
benefits to costs in favor of pursuing a curr.^nh investment strategy or b)
continue to invest when costs exceed returns.
Although future research is warranted before concluding that
psychological commitment outweighs economic concerns, these findings have
s5m3oon 6/11/86
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indicated when the benefits of allocating additional resources are ambiguous,
personal responsibility for a decision systematically affects resource
allocations. Furthermore, responsibility nay alter individuals' perceptions
of future risks (Arkes and Blumer, 1985) as well as their evaluations of
decision outcomes. Thus, for those decisions where a cost/benefit analysis
may be difficult to conduct, as may be the case for decisions involving human
resources or social welfare, psychological commitment may significantly affect
future decisions.
The Prospect Theory Model
Consider the following scenarios.
Scenario 1 . As the president of an aircraft company, you have earmarked
10 million dollars of the company's money to build a plane that would not be
detected by corventicr.al radar. When the project is 905^ complete, another
firn begins marketing a plane that is also not radar detectable and that is
faster and more econo.r.ical than your company's product. Should you invest the
last ^0% (1 million dollars) to finish your plane?
Scenario 2 . As the president of an aircraft company, you have received a
suggestion from one of your employees to use the last 1 million dollars of
your research funds to develop a plane that cannot be detected by conventional
radar. However, another firm has Just begun marketing such a plane. It is
also apparent that their plane is much faster and economical than the plane
your company could build. Should you invest the last million dollars of your
research funds to build the plane proposed by your employee?
Arkes and Blumer (1985) presented each of these scenarios to a different
group of college student subjects and asked them to indit.-ite iihat they would
do as the president of the aircraft company. On the fir;-': scenario, '11 of i»S
subjects polled indicated that they would complete the airplane. On the
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second scenario, 10 of 60 subjects indicated that they would build the
airplane. These results are representative of a series of results presented
by Arkes and Blumer that demonstrate a sensitivity of decision makers to the
prior expenditures made to a project. Using the same scenario, those authors
showed that subjects estimated a larger probability of financial success for
the product in the first scenario when statistically contrasted with the
second. They also showed that the differences between the responses to the
scenarios were not caused by implicit cues about product quality. Subjects
behaved the same when the second scenario required a 10 million dollar
expenditure as when it required a 1 million dollar expenditure.
In order to combat the artificiality of having college students pretend
they are corporate presidents, Arkes and Blumer(1985) also designed an
ingenious field experiment to demonstrate the sunk cost effect. The first 60
people who approached the ticket window to buy season tickets to a University
Theater's program were randomly chosen to be sold one of three types a
tickets: Full price ($15), two-dollar-discount and seven-dollar-discount.
Tickets were color coded so that the attendance of these ticket holders at
events could be monitored by evaluating the ticket stubs for each event. The
data indicated that full price ticket holders attended significantly more of
the events held during the first half of the season than the discount ticket
holders. This result is consistent with the results of the experiments using
the more artificial scenarios, that is, the ticket holviers with the greatest
sunk costs attended the greatest number of events. It is also noteworthy that
the most obvious threat to this study, that ticket holders would sell or loan
their tickets to others, would tend to work against tho obtained results.




Although Arkes and Blumer's experiments were conducted in simple
contexts, they provide convincing evidence that decisions are affected by sunk
costs. Later in this paper, we shall argue that sunk costs will have even
more potent effects in most managerial contexts. At this point, we describe a
theory to explain the results of these simple studies.
Thaler (19S0) suggested an explanation of sunk cost effects, of the type
found by Arkes and Bluir.er, that was based on prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). At the heart of this theory is the value function,
illustrated in Figure 2, that maps the dolla:- amount of gains or losses onto
the value (or utility) experienced by the recipient. This empirically derived
function, defined over gains and losses with respect to some natural reference
point, is concave for gains (v) and convex for losses (v) and is steeper for
losses than gains. This value function can be used to explain the sunk cost
effects observed by Arkes and Blumer. In the aircraft president example,
suppose that the value of the plane to the aircraft company, in the face of
competition, is v(g), and that the value of the cost of the plane (i.e. the
R4D expenditure) is v(-lOM) in the first scenario and v(-1M) in the second
scenario. Further, let us assume that v(g) = -v(-1M) so that the allocator
would be indifferent to making the expenditure in the second scenario. The
value position of the allocator in the firct scenario is v(-9M), or the value
of the sunk cost. The shift from indifferancc to action in the case of sunk
costs is explained by the convexity of the value function for losses
since v(g)*v(-10M) > v(-9M). Thaler (1980) describes this as a kind of
"cognitive accounting". In the first scenario, where there are sunk costs,
the allocator equates costs to losses and evaluates the situation from a loss
position whereas, without sunk costs, the situation is evaluated from a
neutral position. The starting position or "frame" (Tversky and Kahneman,
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1931) from which the decision maker evaluates the decision is critical. In
general, the larger the sunk cost, the greater the impact of any gain on the
final value position.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Unlike the other escalation and entrapment paradigms v/hich have evaluated
a range of context effects on decision makers, the prospect theory paradigm is
entirely cognitive. The major consideration of prospect theory is the way
that the decision maker edits or frames the situation, that is, does he/she
perceive the current position as positive (gain) or negative (loss). By the
mechanisms described above, the framing of the situation then affects the net
utilities assigned to the various decision alternatives.
Biases Caused by Sunk Costs
As the literature reviewed above indicates, there is evidence that sunk
costs have an effect on the behaviors of decision makers who experience
them. This section specifically identifies the various effects that have been
associated with sunk costs and, using the literature, discusses the conditions
under which the effects are likely to occur. We have sorted these effects, or
biases, into three categories: Effects on decisions, effects on information
creation and search, and effects on information transmission or communication.
Sunk Costs and Decisions
A dominant finding, which cuts across all three paradigms, is that the
experiencing of sunk costs is frequently associated with continuation, or even
escalation, of allocations to a course of action. It is important to note
that this type of effect has not been consistently observed, and there appear
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to be several preconditions necessary for the effect to be obtained. These
conditions, which we shall discuss below, are (1) the amount and type of
information available to the decision maker, (2) the perception that foregoing
sunk costs would be wasteful, (3) the relationship between the allocation and
some more general strategy of the decision maker, and (U) the salience of
opportunity costs.
Information Issues . The quantity and content of the information
available to decision makers appears to be a critical feature of escalation
and entrapment experiments. The decision maker, in both of these paradigms,
is placed in a position of relative "information poverty" where few if any
rational guidelines are available. Staws' (1976) experiment provides a good
illustration. In this experiment, the individuals who tended to escalate
(i.e., the high responsibility - failure condition illustrated in Figure 1)
were asked to decide how much to allocate to the R&D efforts of a corporate
division. The s3_-e division had received 5 million in R&D funds five years
earlier, but perfor~ance had continued to decline. The only data available to
assist allocators in this decision were the sales and earnings of the division
since the last allocation was made, and the instruction that a fixed pool of
funds is available to fund R&D which, if not used on the corporate division,
will be used to fund other projects.
The information given to the allocator in this scenario is insufficient
for the him/her to apply normative guidelines to the decision. Even though
Staw's results show that allocators who were responsible for a failure tended
to allocate greater amounts to the failing project than those who were not
responsible, this is not convincing evidence that the allocators were
rejecting normative decision rules. Recently, two studies have suggested that
this impoverished information environment rray be essential for the
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demonstration of escalation. In a study by the authors (Leatherwood and
Conlon, 1986), the information provided to allocators in a high-
responsibility, failure situation was varied. Subjects were required to make
additional investments to a real estate project where, in one condition, they
had net present value information, and in the other they did not. The NPV
suggested project continuation and further investment. We found that (1) the
allocations of the subjects receiving NPV information had less variance and
(2) were less frequently above the normatively determined amount (i.e. what it
should take to finish the project) than those not receiving the NPV
information. Conlon and Parks (1986), using Staw's (1976) experimental
design, found that subjects who were sensitized to the lack of information
available to theni tended to withhold funds from the corporate division, rather
than escalating like the subjects in Staw's study. Together, these studies
suggest that escaiazion of allocations is most likely when either the risks of
escalating are ~a.de salient to decision makers, or when Justifiable norms for
allocations are not available.
Waste Issues . There is evidence that allocators are affected by the
extent to which the foregoing of sunk costs is perceived as wasteful, flrkes
and Bluirer (1985) created a dilemma where subjects were asked whether or not
to spend money on a new piece of manufacturing equipment that would be
significantly more economical than existing equipment having no salvage
value. In the low waste condition, the existing equipment had been owned by
the firm for some time. In the high waste condition, the firm had recently
purchased the equipment. In the former case, subjects wt'jre far more likely to
buy the new equipment than in the latter case. It appears that tho relative




Strategy Issues . Sometimes an investment or allocation to a project is
closely tied to a corporate strategy or plan. In these cases, the tendency to
continue the project is enhanced by the existence of the strategy. Several
e.xamples of this were identified by Conlon and Wolf (1983), who used focus
group interviews to gather information about the actual sunk cost experiences
of managers. These interviews were conducted with small groups of senior
managers in a convenience sample of nine corporations headquartered in a
single American city. The result of the interviews, which were taped, was the
identification of sixteen decisions in which sunk costs were present. More
specifically, these were decisions where a resource commitment had been made
with disappointing results, and a decision had to be made to continue resource
allocation to the course of action.
In four of these cases, the decision to continue a losing course of
action was Justified using the relationship between the course of action and
corporate strategy as a Justification for continuing. In one case, a
financial service company had opened a branch office in Mew York City. Over
five years, this office lost an average of one million dollars per year.
Nonetheless, the company continued the operation of the office because of the
importance of "having a New York presence" in its general strategy of moving
from a regionally to a nationally known firm. In another example, a high
technology firm entered a new product market five years before the market was
capable of sustaining a positive cash flow for the product line. Although the
company was not aware of this delay going into the venture, continuation was
Justified by the strategy of the firm to dominate its product markets by
establishing a "first mover advantage".
Interestingly, the managers in the New Yorl-: City office case claimed,
although accounting data could not prove it, that the firm's presence in New
s5m3con 6/11/86
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York City created client relationships that "spilled over" into products and
services that were not handled by the New York office, thus asserting the
financial wisdom of the decision as a matter of faith.
Opportunity Costs . Recently, Morthcraft and Neale (I986) investigated
the effects that the salience of opportunity costs had on the tendency of
decision makers to escalate. Perhaps not surprisingly, they found that when
opportunity costs were made salient, the tendency of allocators to continue a
course of action was reduced. Their results suggest that the escalation
phenomenon in part reflects the tendency of allocators to ignore opportunity
costs.
Biases in Information Search and Creation
The presence of sunk costs may also be related to the types of
information sought and created by managers. Staw (198I) proposed that
escalation occurs as individuals try to justify their past behavior using
present actions. That is, they seek to make their past behavior appear
rational, a process Staw calls retrospective rationality. This is in stark
contrast to prospective rationality, in which decision makers attempt to
maximize their future outcomes. In a recent study, one of the authors
evaluated this theory by examining the kinds of information sought by decision
makers in the escalation context (Conlon and Parks, I986). Using the same
design as Staw (1976), the study allowed allocators to request various types
of information prior to making their R&D allocation to the corporate division
funded earlier. Based on a prescaling by a separate sample, two of the five
types of information files available (i.e., a forecast and a research
prospectus) were determined to be future oriented and useful for Justifying
how much to give to the R&D effort, and three (i.e., an HiD report, n file of
memoranda Justifying the past decision to invest and a report by the CEO on
s5m3con 6/11/86
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past R4D) were determined to be past oriented and useful for Justifying the
past decision to invest in the previously chosen division. Subjects were told
to choose information in the order of its importance to their decision, so
that the first file chosen would be the most important. An analysis of these
information choices across experimental conditions showed that 75% of the
subjects in the high responsibility-failure condition tended to choose
information that was more oriented to justifying the past. Only 205i of the
subjects in the low responsibility or success conditions chose such
information.
The implications of this finding go beyond the specification of the
information preferences of decision makers. These results suggest that the
creation of infortr.ation within organizations may be biased by sunk costs. To
the extent that such information is included in the databases and archives
available to aid future decision makers, the sunk costs could have an impact
on future decisions that are not directly related to the sunk costs. These
biases may also represent a misallocation of the resources spent on the
acquisition and processing of information within organizations.
Transmission of Information
In addition to affecting the types of information that decision makers
request, sunk costs may also affect the types of infornation that decision
makers communicate to others. Faced with negative fee^lback about a project's
financial progress, decision makers may attempt to Juocify, either to
themselves or to others, the resources already sunk into the project.
Consequently, information regarding the project that ij transmitted to others
may be distorted.
Information distortion can take many forms. First, the amount of
favorable and unfavorable information comr.unicated to others may be affected
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by such factors as personal responsibility for the investment decision. A
number of studies report that unfavorable information is often omitted or
filtered when communicating with supervisors (Caldwell and O'Reilly, 1982;
Leatherwood, 1936; O'Reilly, 1978; O'Reilly and Roberts, 1974). The amount of
favorable information that is communicated may, however be increased (Caldwell
and O'Reilly, 1982; O'Reilly, 1978; O'Reilly and Roberts, 1974) or reduced
(Leatherwood, 1986). The transmission of favorable information may depend on
decision makers' beliefs that future setbacks will occur. If decision makers
are uncertain about future events, both positive and negative information
about the investment may be filtered from others (Leatherwood, 1986).
Information impactedness creates problems since others' evaluations of a
project's financial progress will be based on a subset of potentially relevant
information.
Second, decision makers may be selective in comjnunieating events that
could be the underlyir.g causes of a financial setback. Decision makers,
motivated to justify their previous decisions, may cite external events as
being the cause of decision failures. Some recent exajninations of corporate
reports indicate that a firm's financial performance is significantly related
to the types of causal attributions included in annual reports to the
stockholders (Battman and Weitz, 1983; Salancik and Meindl, 1984; Staw,
McKechnie and Puffer, 1983). While high performing firms cited internal
factors as the cause of their financial performance, low performing firms
included more external attributions in their reports (Bettman and Weitz, 1983;
Staw et al., 1983).
The decision context has also been shown to affect inrormat ion
distortion. When decision makers were constrained from filtering negative
information from others, more information about external causes for the
s5m3con 6/11/86
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failure was communicated (Leatherwood, 1986). These results suggest that
information filtration may be used when decision makers have an information
advantage. But, under conditions where the information recipient is privy to
information about the investment strategy, the communicator may manipulate
causal attributions to justify the previous decision.
Finally, information distortion may result from the communication of
information that, by contrast, makes the outcomes of an individual's actions
appear more favorable (Campbell, 1958; Leatherwood, 1986). If a setback
reduces the rate of return on an investment from 2^% to 16%, decision makers
may report that another investment is only showing a 12% return. Thus, in
comparision, the project with the l6fo return may be more favorably evaluated
by others.
Information distortions may occur for a number of reasons. First,
inforination distortion may be the result of a perceptual bias. That is,
decision makers nay pay more attention to confirming versus disconf irming
evidence. As a result, more positive and less negative information may be
co.mnunicated to cchers. Alternatively, responsibility for a decision may
result in more optimistic projections of future returns (Bazerman, Beekun and
Schoorman, 1982). Thus, decision makers may minimize the value of negative
information and search for external causal events that are likely to be short
term. Finally, decision makers may distort information in order to justify
the correctness of their decision to others. Consequently, responsibility for
a decision that has suffered a setback may result in attempts at impression
management with ochers through information transmission.
Managing the Decision Context
This section of the paper describes several strategies for structuring
and managing decision contexts to avoid some of the biases associated with
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sunk costs. These strategies involve: Improving the recognition of sunk
costs, providing appropriate incentives, providing appropriate information,
and utilizing organizational structure.
The Recognition of Sunk Costs
According to Kaplan, "sunk costs are those costs unaffected by the choice
from the present set of alternatives" (1982, p. 28). One of the problems faced
by elementary cost accounting students and experienced managers is recognizing
that sunk costs are not irrelevant, but they are already accounted for by
normative (prospective) models and that any further consideration of those
costs would be equivalent to "double counting" or overweighting their
influence on decisions. For example, it is certainly relevant that the
aircraft company in Arkes and Blumer's scenario had spent 9 million in
research and development on a "radar proof" airplane, but the relevance of
these costs is captured in the sales potential and costs of manufacturing the
airplane. Hopefully, the expenditure has created assets in the form of plans,
knowledge and capabilities that will be reflected in the costs and market
potential of the product. Any further consideration of the amount spent on
R&D, beyond this asset value, is normatively inappropriate.
Why do students and managers have trouble treating sunk costs in the
normatively appropriate way? One problem is that project evaluation is
sometimes confused with the periodic evaluation of a project's performance.
In the former, the overall feasibility (ex ante) or wisdom (ex post) of the
project is questioned. In the latter, the question ic one of project
continuation. It can be economically rational to dis'^.ontinue a project that
would yield overall positive returns or to continue or.e having overall
negative returns depending on the best use of current TuncLs. Independently of
how a manager's performance is evaluated or how his incentives are determined,
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it may be difficult to ignore the overall performance of a project when making
day to day decisions about continuation. Northcraft and Wolf (1984) discuss
how, when unexpectedly high costs are incurred early in a project's life
cycle, decision makers may attempt to "recover" those costs through further
allocation. This notion of recovery is equivalent to an attempt to improve
the overall performance of a project by remaining in a project at the point
where much of the costs have been experienced and revenues are beginning to
accrue.
One way to reduce the confusion that occurs between overall project
performance and periodic evaluation for allocation decisions is to carefully
structure the information available to allocators. Northcraft and Wolf (1984)
suggest the use of time adjusted rates of return (TARR) (Horngren, 1982) to
guide decisions based on periodic performance evaluations. TARR considers
only the future cashflow implications of continuing a project, and sucessfully
separates the decision to continue a project from the overall project
perfor.mance. The ir.pact of the sunk cost en project performance is given by a
comparison of the overall performance of the project with an organizational
goal or expectation for the project. The impact of sunk costs that is
relevant to current decisions is given by TARR. A limitation of TARR is the
requirement that all future costs and benefits be quantified. This may be
particularly troublesome for projects whose benefits are largely social, are
diffuse, or where the completion of the project is a necessary event in a
broader strategy that chains a nu.iiber of projects together in n temporal
sequence. Even when TARR can be calculated, wc feel that the control of
decision biases attributable to sunk costs depends on how the decision makers'




The effects of incentive structures on individuals' decision behaviors
ha/e been examined in the literature on agency relationships. Agency theory
(Demski, I98O; Demski and Feltham, 1978; Ross, 1973) addresses the problems
that are likely to arise when one party, an agent, is given authority for
decisions that affect a principal's profits. When information between the
principal and the agent is symmetric (i.e., the principal observes the actions
of the agent via monitoring systems or task design), problems of agent
negligence or face saving are not expected. In these cases, the principal can
take recourse if the agent shirks or attempts to conceal information. Thus,
the principal, presLi.-nably lacking psychological commitment to any particular
investment decision, will be able to assess the expected benefits to be
derived from investments and provide checks and balances against the agent's
investment decisions.
For many cases, however, information will not be shared between the two
parties (i.e., asyr.'etric) . Consequently, if the agent distorts information,
either through ccrrjnunications or by assembling an incomplete or biased
information base, the principal will not be privy to the information that may
allow for a more objective assessment of costs and benefits.
In the case where information asymmetries arise, some agency theorists
recommend that contractual arrangements be used to motivate agents to exert
additional decision effort or to minimize face saving attempts. By
implementing outcome controls that couple agents' financial rewards with the
financial outcomes of their decisions, agency theory implicitly assumes that
agents will be more objective in calculatinr^ future returns since their future
financial outcomes are contingent on the benefits derived from their
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investment decisions. Outcome controls, however, may not always reduce the
biases that may arise following setbacks that create sunk costs.
As discussed in the previous section, TARR provides a clear specification
of when a financial setback is likely to constitute a rational decision to
terminate or abandon a project. However, as noted by Northcraft and Wolf
(1984), finishing a project efficiently based on a TARR for periods later in
the project's life cycle may not offset the project's overall subpar
performance. Stated differently, even if a project is destined to lose money
overall, there rr.ay be a point in the project's life cycle after which the TARR
obtained by additional allocations will be greater than what could be obtained
by alternative investment opportunities. Thus, as pointed out by Northcraft
and Wolf (1934), if agents can get the project to that point in its life
cycle, their periodic performance reviews will look good for the remainder of
the project. Consequently, if the principal rewards the agent for turning a
loss into a success versus holding the agent accountable for an entire
project, suboptimal investment decisions may result. Prior to implementing
incentive structures that couple an agent's rewards with decision outcomes,
managers should carefully consider what investment outcomes are desirable.
Outcome controls may also affect the budgeting and accounting techniques
that agents use for calculating costs and benefits. Some techniques may
indicate gains that reflect favorably on the decision maker. However, these
gains may be of a short-run nature. A recent study by Hill (1986) indicates
that management may be sensitive to these aberrations and, in the case where
responsibility centers are implemented, internal audits may bo increased to




Finally, coupling an agent's financial outcomes with investment returns
may exacerbate cognitive biases. The prospect theory model proposes that the
utilities for gains are treated differently than for losses. If agents are
risk averse toward gains but risk prone toward losses, a financial setback
that threatens loss of personal income may lead to greater efforts to turn a
setback around by escalating resources to the investment strategy.
This section has noted some of the potential problems that could arise
from i.mplementing incentive systems that may not be aligned with the
organization's best interests. The behavioral research suggests that
individuals become psychologically committed to pursuing an investment
strategy and, as a result, perceptual biases, information biases and
information distortion may result. Ultimately, incentive systems that reduce
these biases are desired. In order to reduce these effects, incentive systems
should be considered that reward agents for considering various investment
alternatives, obtaining and sharing relevant information about investments
along with realizing good returns from their investment decisions. By
focusing attention on decision processes in addition to decision outcomes,
agency problems of this nature may be minimized.
Providing Appropriate Information
Providing certain types of information to agents may also reduce the
biases that may result from sunk costs. The research on entrapment indicates
that cost/benefit information reduces the amount of time and resources that
individuals expend (Rubin and Brockner, 1975). In addition, the point at
which this information is provided during the decision process also has been
shown to affect resource allocations. Cost/benefit information has been shown
to be more effective when provided prior to the investment process than when




-h.- biases that may result from sunk costs, agents should be aware of
the >'-'3ts
-ind the expected benefits of additional expenditures. This
info: :M^t i,,ri should be made salient prior to selecting an investment strategy
and
.-.ii.jLii,! ^Q updated at regular intervals, especially prior to additional
expeM,|j.tuf es.
'f agents are responsible for gathering and compiling this information
them^a [ve-j
^ computer assisted systems that allow for a number of cost/benefit
calc'.i
1 ations should be accessible to reduce the time necessary for such
erfofis.
^ system that incorporates TARR would also aid agents in determining
11 cv.i-rent. rates of return are biased in favor of continuing the investment
W"^^= the overall returns are less than the investment costs.
'inaiiy, managers should affirm the utility of considering this
in ^"^ * u
'^'itiiin. That is, if a setback renders an investment suboptimal in
rela.ion to an alternative investment strategy, agents should be assured that
s
'•Tpoi-ation values this information and their communication of this 3ata.
l^^ilL:-
-'JjT£_ Orgar.lzational Structures
fn a^ldition to providing appropriate incentives and information to assist
S
--s in their investment decisions, various organizational structures may
^ Tiiniinize agency problems. Although hierarchical control over investments
W L X 1 *-ireauoe agents' abilities to become entrapped by their previous decisions,
-'"chloal controls are costly and time consuming. If upper management is
4 '-ed to continually evaluate and approve expenditures, the opportunity
cost-,: of this attention will be high.
Internal and external auditing procedures have been a common practice for
J I inancial institutions. These procedures ensure stockholders and upper
- maivijgers that agents' decisions are in their best interests. However,
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these practices are not free and the costs will be borne by the firm or by the
shareholders.
Williamson (1975) contends that worker peer groups can provide similar
benefits to the organization that are traditionally derived from hierarcliical
controls or costly auditing procedures. Worker peer groups, or teams, provide
a number of efficiencies in the decision process. First, the cost of
providing information to agents is economized. Policies regarding incentive
structures, evaluation procedures, the value of cost/benefit information or
the benefits to be derived from an investment strategy can be communicated
more efficiently to teajns than to individual agents.
Teams not only allow for providing appropriate information in a more
efficient manner, but nay also reduce information distortions. Given that
tea.T,3 change the "ow-.ership arrangements" (i.e., access to investment
information), individual agents will be constrained from nondisclosure or
dis'ortion of relevant information. Holmstrom (1982) has shown that
competition among agents, such as would result from teams or multi-agent
settings, has merit as a device to extract information. Thus, information
impactedness may be reduced through the use of investment teams.
In summary, the formation of teams for investment decisions may be an
effective way to reduce the biases arising from sunk costs. As long as team
members are engaged in a common investment strategy or an integrated set of
investment strategies, team members will be able to mutually monitor one
another. Because the team, rather than any individual agent, is better able
to bear risks, the team approach may be preferred by individual agents as
well. Finally, the team approach allows for better ex ante screening of






It should be evident to the reader that most of the research on responses
to sunk costs has been conducted by behavioral scientists, rather than
financial researchers. This trend has had several implications for this
review. The most important of these is that the experimental contexts used to
produce and evaluate sunk costs effects may or may not resemble the decision
making contexts assuned by financial theorists when they develop and prescribe
normative approaches to financial decisions. The financial theorist may
wonder if the sunk cost phenomena revealed by the behavioral literature are
applicable to most prototypical financial decision making contexts. Our
response to that question would be to concur that much of the research may
have been "contextually naive" or "normatively naive", but also to stress that
there is no pri-.a facie case for assuming that the escalation, entrapment and
prospect theory effects would not generalize to investment decisions, loan
decisions, merger and divestiture decisions and many of the other contexts of
interest to the financial researcher. We believe that financial researchers
should begin to conduct their own investigations of the phenomenon. These
investigations are likely to be more tightly tied to particular decision
contexts and are likely to use non-laboratory methodologies. The authors know
of only a few studies which have attempted to investigate a variety of sunk
cost decisions in real contexts. One study already mentioned, by Conlon and
Wolf (1933), suffers from the problem of non-comparability of contexts. The
16 decisions identified in that study were distributee! across issues of merger
and acquisition, capital improvement, new product development and business
expansion. In contrast, the financial researcher interested in mergers and
divestitures might exclusively study real instances of those decisions and
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compare cases with sunk cost considerations with those having no sunk costs.
A field study by DeSondt and Majkeja (1935) is an example of such work. These
authors investigated the impact of sunk costs in the electric utility industry
and were unable to provide strong support for a sunk cost effect. The
financial researcher's familiarity with particular decision contexts should
produce stronger evidence and insights into the nature of sunk cost effects,
as they occur in the field, than those offered in previous research.
Since most of the research conducted by financial researchers involves
the prediction and explanation of phenomena through the use of economic
models, it is useful to ask how the sunk cost phenomenon might be investigated
within such research methods. The tactic used by most financial researchers
who have investigated behavioral phenomena (e.g., de Bondt and Thaler, 1985;
Shefrin and Statn-.an, 1935; Shiller & Pound, 1986) has been to observe
behavioral outconies and to systematically compare them with the outcomes that
would be predicted by established financial models. The test of the
"behavioral effect," then, involves the comparison of the observed pattern of
residuals (i.e., observed outcomes - expected outcomes) with the size and
signs of the residuals that would be predicted by the behavioral effect. A
good example is de Bondt and Thaler's (1985) examination of stock market
overreaction to unexpected or dramatic news events. Using CRSP data, they
compared the returns, residualized by the capital asset pricing model, of two
stock portfolios over 36 months. The "loser" portfolio consisted of stocks
which had experienced extreme capital losses in the pre-portfolio formation
months, and the "winner" portfolio consisted of stock;.; which had experienced
extreme gains in that same period. The data revealed that the cumulative
average residuals of the "loser" portfolio dramatically exceeded those of the
winner portfolio over the 36 month period. In other words, the null
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hypothesis was that the returns of the two portfolios, once adjusted by the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (i.e., the normative model), would be
equivalent. The size and direction of the obtained difference was consistent
with the overreaction hypothesis which was based on the behavioral theory that
forecasters would tend to underweight base rate data and overweight recent or
dramatic information when predicting the future.
A similar strategy could be used by financial modelers to explore sunk
cost effects. Just as de Bondt and Thaler operationalized differences in
inforniation by forming and classifying two a priori portfolios, financial
researchers could parameterize sunk costs by partitioning a class of firms or
individuals according to the degree of experienced sunk costs. In the weakest
instar.ee, this would result in a categorical distinction (i.e., sunk costs
present vs. sunk cost absent) and in the strongest, a ratio measure of the
extent of these costs (i.e., a continuous variable). Once parameterized, sunk
cost effects ccuid be evaluated in combination with the more traditional
eccr.otnic predictors of firm or individual behavior. The effective use of this
research strategy requires that the normative (or traditional) model is
properly specified and is not confounded with the sunk cost distinction. In
particular, it should not be possible to argue that the sunk cost parameter
acts as a surrogate for parameters left unspecified (e.g., risk) by the
economic model. A good example of this concern, and its treatment, is
discussed by de Bondt and Thaler (1985).
It is likely that the most important limitation on sunk cost research,
using traditional econometric methods, is the relative unavailability of
data. Most obvious examples of sunk costs apply to particular projects or
types of investments. Ideally, the researcher should be able to determine the
amount invested in a particular course of action and its result in terms of
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asset creation or some other value metric. When firms are the unit of
analysis, an adequate methodology may require going beyond standard financial
tapes to obtain these values. Researchers interested in sunk costs at the
firm level should attempt to find industries that have established accounting
and reporting standards for particular types of expenditures. Often industry
publications or annual reports will contain useful data. Researchers
interested in individual investor behavior may rely either on specialized,
archival data bases (e.g. Sheffrin and Statman, 1985) for analyzing whole
classes of investors, or questionnaire data (e.g., Shiller and Pound, I986)
for exa-mining the actions and attitudes of specific investors.
Financial researchers should also be interested in how financial
information may contribute to sunk cost effects. The research reported here
on entrapment and escalation suggests that the effects of sunk costs may be
reduced by providing information such as cost/benefit charts and net present
value data. Are there situations where particular types of financial data may
actually contribute to escalation? The distinction between project review and
periodic review suggests such a context. It is possible for periodic review
data (e.g. TARR) to suggest continuation where the project review would
suggest otherwise? The question concerns whether continuation would really be
desirable. It is arguable that in the short run, stockholders and other
important constituencies may be more interested in the overall performance of
projects than in the financial wisdom of the last dollar spent. The overall
policy implications of how sunk costs are managed need to be addressed by
financial theorists. Financial researchers may find it necessary to conduct
experiments, much like those described earlier in thia paper, in order to
evaluate information issues. The external validity of such research could be
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enhanced through careful task design and the use of financial managers as
subjects.
Finally, we want to encourage financial researchers to consider how to
better control the responses of decision makers under sunk cost conditions.
In this paper, we have suggested that information and incentives may be the
key ways to achieve control. Financial researchers should work on the precise
ways in which incentives should be structured and information should be




1. The Adams and Smith financial decision case (Staw, 1976; Staw and Fox,
1977; Fox and Staw, 1979; Conlon and Parks, 1986), the World Bank case
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